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	 	 In	 the	 normally	 restrained	 world	 of	 academic	 discourse,	 the	
Anderson–Thompson	debate	stands	out	as	a	break	with	the	dominant	culture	of	self-
abnegation	and	humility.	Over	the	course	of	three	years	(1964–1966),	noted	Marxist	
historians	 Perry	 Thompson	 and	 Edward	 Thompson	 launched	 a	 series	 of	 spirited	
attacks	on	each	other	that	reach	a	level	of	virulence	rarely	approached	in	scholarly	
publication.1	Yet	 the	sheer	violence	of	 this	debate	masks	 the	 fact	 that	something	
important	was	at	stake,	with	implications	for	historians	of	both	the	Marxist	and	non-
Marxist	variety,	as	well	as	for	historically-oriented	sociologists.
With	the	recent	resurgence	of	interest	in	comparative–historical	sociology,	
both	Anderson	and	Thompson	have	been	written	out	of	the	canon,	for	reasons	that	
are	somewhat	unclear.	For	one,	neither	held	a	conventional	academic	position,	but	
neither	did	Barrington	Moore,	who	 is	widely	 regarded	as	one	of	 the	preeminent	
comparative–historical	sociologists.	Both	are	unabashedly	Marxist,	but	comparative–
historical	sociology	has	long	had	many	adherents	who	locate	themselves	within	the	
Marxian	tradition,	even	if	they	are	not	identifiably	“Marxist.”	Neither	was	trained	as	
a	sociologist,	but	comparative–historical	sociologists	generally	eschew	disciplinary	
distinctions,	embracing	history	and	political	science	as	well	as	sociology.	I	will	argue	
in	 this	 paper	 that	 the	 issues	 raised	 by	 Anderson	 and	 Thompson	 deserve	 to	 be	
repositioned	at	 the	center	of	 the	comparative–historical	project.	 In	 the	process,	 I	
will	position	Anderson	and	Thompson	against	four	other	luminaries	of	comparative	
historical	 sociology:	 Charles	 Tilly,	 Immanuel	 Wallerstein,	 Theda	 Skocpol,	 and	
Craig	Calhoun,	all	of	whom	have	weighed	 in	on	 the	debate	 (Tilly	and	Wallerstein	
lean	 towards	 Thompson,	 while	 Skocpol	 and	 Calhoun	 are	 more	 sympathetic	 to	
Anderson).	 I	will	 argue	 that	 the	Anderson–Thompson	debate	 cuts	 to	 the	 core	 of	
existing	disputes	within	comparative–historical	sociology.	Anderson	and	Thompson	
deserve	to	assume	their	proper	place	not	at	the	margins	but	at	the	center	of	the	
comparative–historical	project.		Finally,	I	will	demonstrate	that	while	the	substantive	
disagreements	between	Anderson	and	Thompson	are	important,	their	debate	was	–	
in	the	last	instance	–	an	argument	about	methodology.
	 Edward	 Thompson	 was	 not,	 strictly	 speaking,	 a	 comparative	
historian.		Thompson’s	best	known	and	most-cited	work,	The Making of the English 
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Working Class,	 is	not	a	comparative	study	at	all.	 Instead,	it	 is	a	lengthy	exposition	
of	working	 class	 development	 in	 a	 single nation,	 spanning	 a	 seven-hundred-year	
period.	 	 Thompson’s	 writing	 style	 usually	 approximates	 what	 a	 historian	 might	
term	 “thick	 description”—a	 painstakingly	 detailed	 narrative	 which	 attempts	 to	
recreate	 and	 give	 life	 to	 working-class	 movements	 and	 cultures	 that	 had	 been	
neglected	by	mainstream	historians.		When	it	was	first	published,	MEWC	was	a	truly	
groundbreaking	work	for	several	reasons.		First,	it	pioneered	the	detailed	study	of	
groups	long	neglected	by	mainstream	historians—the	poor,	the	peasants,	and	the	
incipient	working	class.	Along	with	fellow	working-class	historians	George	Rude	and	
Fernand	Braudel,	Thompson	was	a	pioneer	within	the	field	today	known	as	social	
history.	 Second,	 since	poor	people	 leave	 rarely	 leave	behind	 an	official	 record,	 it	
relied	on	non-traditional	“texts”—songs,	poems,	stories,	and	journalistic	accounts—
to	a	much	greater	extent	than	had	been	done	previously.		Third,	and	most	important	
for	the	purpose	of	this	essay,	it	came	as	a	direct	challenge	to	the	dominant	trend	at	
the	time	in	British	history:	to	heap	praise	upon	Continental	working	class	movements	
(especially	the	French),	while	largely	dismissing	the	British	working	class.		It	was	this	
third	innovation	that	later	drew	the	ire	of	one	Perry	Anderson.
The Debate
	 Three	 fundamental	 theses	 sustain	MEWC.	 The	 first	 is	 co-determination,	
or	the	notion	that	the	working	class	“made	itself	as	much	as	 it	was	made.”	Here,	
Thompson	 is	 clearly	 challenging	 the	myth	of	a	meek,	 submissive	English	working	
class.	He	observes	that	although	British	working-class	movements	never	coalesced	
into	a	party,	and	although	their	revolutionary	efforts	were	abortive	at	best,	British	
history	 is	 checkered	 with	 working-class	 riots,	 revolts,	 uprisings,	 and	 rebellions.	
The	 apparent	 timidity	 of	 working-class	 movements	 is	 as	 much	 a	 consequences	
of	 extraneous	 historical	 conditions	 as	 endogenous	 inadequacies.	 Indeed,	 much	
of	MEWC	 is	 devoted	 to	 chronicling	 the	 forgotten	 history	 of	 British	working-class	
movements,	as	if	to	defend	them	in	the	tribunal	of	history.
	 Thompson’s	second	thesis,	consciousness,	 is	the	idea	that	“class	happens	
where	 some	 men,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 common	 experiences,	 feel	 and	 articulate	 the	
identity	 of	 their	 interests	 as	 between	 themselves,	 and	 as	 against	 other	 men”	
(Thompson	 1964:	 9–10).	 In	 this	 sense,	 class	 is	 not	 a	 static	 object	 of	 study,	 but	
an event	that	happens	under	particular	circumstances.	By	implication,	workers	who	
suffer	from	false	consciousness	or	fail	to	understand	their	class	position	do	not	truly	
comprise	a	class.3	In	the	process,	Thompson	introduces	two	key	variables	that	tend	
to	be	missing	 from	 traditional	 accounts	 of	 class	 formation:	 ideology	 and	 culture.	
Thompson’s	 fundamental	 intellectual	 project	 in	MEWC	 is	 to	 uphold	 the	 creative	
activity	and	autonomy	of	English	radicalism	against	those	who	would	describe	it	as	
a	passive	object	of	industrialization.
	 Lastly,	Thompson,	in	asserting	that	the	English	working	class	was	essentially	
completed	by	the	early	1830s,	puts	forward	the	idea	of	closure.	After	the	1830s,	the	
English	working	class	is	properly	described	as	no	longer	“in	the	making”	but	“made.”	
However,	the	class	was	unmade	in	the	period	between	the	1850s	and	the	1870s.	
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Anderson	would	take	 issue	which	each	of	these	theses	 in	turn,	although	the	bulk	
of	his	argument	concerns	a	critique	of	the	third	and	final	thesis	(closure),	which	is	a	
historiographical	matter,	not	a	theoretical	concern.
	 The	 20-mile	 channel	 separating	 Britain	 from	 continental	 Europe	may	 as	
well	be	an	ocean:	Britain	 lags	behind	the	rest	of	Western	Europe	on	nearly	every	
social	 measure,	 has	 a	 comparatively	 weak	 labor	 movement,	 and,	 of	 particular	
interest	to	Perry	Anderson,	has	no	viable	anti-capitalist	political	parties.3		Anderson’s	
“Origins”	reads	as	an	extended	lamentation	on	the	current	state	of	British	politics.	
The	titular	“present	crisis”	refers	to	the	Conservative	Party’s	13-year	winning	streak	
in	 national	 politics,	 which	 would	 draw	 to	 a	 close	 with	 the	 election	 of	 a	 Labour	
government	only	months	after	Anderson’s	article	was	published.	Nevertheless,	by	
the	early	1960s,	the	Labour	Party,	wracked	by	internal	crisis,	was	a	shell	of	its	former	
self	and	no	longer	an	“authentic”	working-class	formation	(if	it	ever	had	been).	To	
be	 sure,	Gaullist	 France	was	 no	workers’	 paradise	 either,	 but	 the	 Socialist	 (SFIO)	
and	Communist	 (PCF)	Parties	remained	viable	oppositional	 forces	throughout	the	
1960s,	and	both	were	far	to	the	left	of	Britain’s	Labour.	More	to	the	point,	the	French	
labor	movement	 in	 the	 1960s	was	 the	 envy	 of	 union	militants	worldwide,	while	
British	unions	were	relatively	quiescent.	In	Anderson’s	admiration	for	the	militancy	
and	 (relative)	 successes	of	 the	French	working	 class,	 his	 Francophilia	 is	 palpable.	
Anderson	embodies	the	stereotypical	self-hating	Brit.4
	 In	 a	 review	essay	 on	Anderson,	 Theda	 Skopol	 and	Mary	 Fulbrook	write:	
“France	represents	the	central	line	of	evolutionary	advance.	From	antiquity	onward,	
the	histories	of	the	French	core	approximate	most	clearly	the	Marxist	concepts	of	key	
modes	of	production	and	their	progressive	succession”	(Skocpol	1984:	199).		But	a	
problem	emerges	when	Anderson	conflates	his	“model”	(orthodox	Marxist	working-
class	formation)	with	the	closest	actually-existing	approximation	(France).		Clearly,	
France	deviates	in	important	ways	from	Marx’s	preordained	historical	model.		But	
in	much	of	Anderson’s	writing,	France	functions	practically	as	a	stand-in	for	Marxist	
teleology.		In	this	view,	Britain	is	deficient	because	it	fails	to	follow	the	preordained	
“script.”
	 Anderson	conceives	of	French	history	as	the	shining	example	of	revolutionary	
purity	 in	three	respects:	 (1)	 the	French	bourgeoisie	at	 the	time	of	 the	Revolution	
was	 fully	 developed	 and	 provided	 an	 appropriate	 target	 for	 proletarian	 rage;	 (2)	
the	social	democratic	state	that	emerged	after	the	Jacobins	was	an	ideal	model	for	
an	early	proletarian	movement;	 and	 (3)	 contemporary	 French	communism	 is	 the	
proper	embodiment	of	a	mature	proletarian	movement.	Even	before	the	advent	of	
capitalism,	Northern	France	always	conformed	more	closely	to	the	archetypal	feudal	
system	than	any	other	region	of	the	continent.	In	this	sense,	French	history	achieves	
“holistic	 integrity,	 functional	 systematicity,	 and	 continuity”	 (Skocpol	 1984:	 32).	 In	
contrast,	 Britain	 proves	 itself	 inadequate	 in	 each	 of	 these	 respects.	 The	 English	
civil	war	occurred	far	too	early,	the	political	system	that	emerged	in	 its	wake	was	
attenuated,	and	contemporary	British	Marxism	was	(and	is)	isolated	and	marginal.
	 Anderson	has	a	number	of	other	serious	complaints	about	Thompson.		While	
he	 does	 not	 dispute	 the	 essential	 facts	 of	 Thompson’s	 exhaustive	 account,	 he	
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is	 dismissive	 of	 movements	 that	 result	 in	 failure,	 whatever	 their	 potential.	 Put	
simply,	 Anderson	 is	 far	 more	 interested	 in	 outcomes	 than	 in	 process.	 Most	
fundamentally,	Anderson	disputes	Thompson’s	concept	of	class,	which	he	considers	
insufficiently	 economic.	 Anderson	writes:	 “The	 thrust	 of	 [Thompson’s]	 argument	
is	 still	 to	 detach	 class	 from	 its	 objective	 anchorage	 in	 determinate	 relations	 of	
production,	and	identify	it	with	subjective	consciousness	or	culture	...	It	is	better	to	
say,	with	Marx,	that	social	classes	may	not	become	conscious	of	themselves,	may	fail	
to	act	or	behave	in	common,	but	they	still	remain,	materially,	historically—classes”	
(Anderson	1980:	43).	Instead,	Anderson	argues	for	a	“concept	of	class	as	an	objective	
relation	 to	 the	means	 of	 production,	 independent	 of	will	 or	 attitude”	 (Anderson	
1980:	38).		Here,	Anderson	quotes	G.	W.	Cohen	who	argues	that	“a	person’s	class	is	
established	by	nothing	but	his	objective	place	in	the	network	of	ownership	relations	
…	His	 consciousness,	 culture	 and	 politics	 do	 not	 enter	 the	 definition	 of	 his	 class	
position”	(Cohen	1978:	73).			(As	usual,	Anderson	is	probably	overstating	his	case	in	
this	passage	for	the	sake	of	polemic.)		Finally,	Anderson	criticizes	Thompson’s	notion	
that	 class	 struggle	 might	 exist	 without	 class	 per se.	 For	 Anderson,	 Thompson’s	
definition	of	class	is	far	too	“voluntarist	and	subjectivist,”	for	“classes	have	frequently	
existed	whose	members	did	not	identify	their	antagonistic	interests	in	any	process	
of	 common	 struggle”	 (Anderson	 1980:	 40).	 Put	 differently,	 Anderson	 posits	 that	
classes	exist	objectively—even	when	people	fail	to	behave	in	class	ways.
	 Anderson’s	 “Origins”	 is	 essentially	 a	 two-case	 comparison	 between	 the	
“British	model”	and	the	“French	model.”	Although	Anderson	frequently	refers	to	the	
“continental”	 pattern,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 “continental”	 is	merely	 a	 proxy	 for	 “French,”	
since	 Germany	 and	 Italy	 are	 themselves	 merely	 inferior	 approximations	 of	 the	
French	pattern.	Moreover,	Anderson	positions	the	French	model	at	the	center	of	his	
analysis.	Even	though	he	spills	more	ink	discussing	the	British	pattern,	this	is	mainly	
for	 the	 purpose	 of	 illuminating	 its	 inadequacies	 as	 against	 the	 French	 example	 of	
revolutionary	 perfection.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 French	 pattern	 is	 ideal-typical	 (in	 the	
normative	 sense	 of	 the	 term);	 it	 is	 the	model	 against	which	 all	 other	 possibilities	
must	 be	 evaluated.	 Anderson’s	 model	 of	 British	 exceptionalism	 clearly	 refers	 not	
only	to	difference,	but	to	British	inferiority.	Scholars	like	Aristide	Zolberg	(2009)	who	
study	exceptionalism	debate	whether	exceptionalism	 implies	distinction	or	merely	
difference.	In	this	case,	there	can	be	no	question	that	Britain’s	“exceptionalism”	refers	
to	its	inferiority.		
	 Thompson’s	rebuttal	to	“Origins”	comes	in	Poverty.	In	general,	Thompson	
does	not	dispute	the	facts	of	Anderson’s	account,	although	he	takes	issue	with	some	
of	 Anderson’s	 historiographical	 assumptions—especially	 his	 periodization.5	 But	
Thompson’s	main	 line	of	(counter-)attack	 is	methodological.	He	claims	that	cross-
national	 comparisons	 are	 only	 meaningful	 insofar	 as	 pre-existing	 conditions	 are	
themselves	comparable.	In	other	words,	the	French	model	cannot	be	meaningfully	
applied	to	foreign	turf.	Given	Britain’s	unique	class	structure,	agrarian	population,	
geographical	 isolation,	 and	 a	 host	 of	 other	 factors,	 all	 of	 which	 pre-date	
industrialization,	 Britain	 could	 not	 have	 been	 reasonably	 expected	 to	 follow	 the	
French	pattern.		His	observations	here	approximate	Aristide	Zolberg’s	(2009)	view	
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of	difference.		As	Ira	Katznelson	and	Zolberg	have	written,	there	is	a	tendency	within	
history	to	set	up	a	single	“model”	of	working-class	formation	against	which	all	actual	
historical	experiences	are	judged	as	“exceptional”	or	“deviant.”		The	remainder	of	
Poverty consists	of	a	commentary	on	the	misappropriation	of	Althusser	by	Anderson	
(of	which	more	later).
	 Finally,	Anderson	gets	in	the	last	word	with	Socialism.	 	On	the	first	pages	
of	Socialism,	Thompson	is	charged	with	“paranoia	and	bad	faith,”	“virulent	travesty	
and	abuse,”	“reckless	falsification”	(Anderson	1966:	1,	2).	The	brunt	of	Anderson’s	
critique	is	concerned	with	what	he	considers	a	mischaracterization	of	his	ideas	by	
Thompson.		He	writes,	“far	from	evincing	the	class	reductionism	of	which	Thompson	
accuses	 us,	 we—once	 again—explicitly and categorically rejected it”	 (Anderson	
1966:	 10;	 emphasis	 in	 original).	 But	 Anderson	 then	 proceeds	 to	 take	 aim	 at	
Thompson’s	 understanding	 of	 class,	which	 he	 considers	 too	malleable.	 Anderson	
may	not	be	a	proper	class	reductionist	in	the	pejorative	sense,	but	he	clearly	has	in	
mind	a	more	essentialist,	objective	view	of	class	than	does	Thompson	(as	evidenced	
by	his	reliance	on	the	“analytic	Marxism”	of	Cohen).		Anderson’s	attempt	to	dismiss	
Thompson	by	pointing	to	their	commonalities	therefore	appears	misguided.
	 Anderson	 scores	 more	 points	 with	 his	 attack	 on	 Thompson’s	 crude	
populism,	writing,	“concrete	analysis	of	class	or	social	groups	…	is	relinquished	for	a	
perpetual,	sententious	invocation	of	‘the	people’—that	is,	exactly	the	terminology	of	
populism”;	and	continuing:	“where	‘the	people’	rather	than	concrete,	determinate	
social	groups	are	continually	 invoked	as	the	victims	of	 injustice	and	the	agents	of	
social	change,	it	becomes	natural	to	speak	of	the	role	of	this	people	as	a	nation	with	
a	pre-eminent	destiny	among	other	peoples”	 (Anderson	1966:	34).	 	 But	more	 to	
the	point,	“the	people”	is	a	vague	grouping	that	functions	much	more	readily	as	a	
rhetorical	device	than	as	an	operationalizable	category.		Anderson’s	stylistic	criticism	
of	Thompson	is	a	veneer	for	his	more	important	methodological	criticism.
Commentary
	 If	 the	 Anderson	 thesis	 is	 reductionist,	 it	 is	 far	 less	 so	 than	 some	 of	 his	
contemporaries—for	example	James	Hinton,	who	criticized	Anderson	“for	assertion	
of	 primacy	 to	 the	 political	 and	 ideological	 factors”—practically	 the	 opposite	 of	
Thompson’s	 critique.	 Anderson	 is	 somewhere	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 spectrum	 of	
class	 formation	 literature,	 distant	 from	 both	 the	 economic	 determinist	 and	 the	
interpretivist	 extremes.	 Even	 an	 extreme	 interpretivist	 like	 Aronowitz	 cautions	
against	overemphasizing	the	cultural	component	of	collective	action.		Speaking	of	the	
social	historians	who	followed	Thompson	(though	he	might	as	well	be	commenting	
on	Thompson	himself),	Aronowitz	writes,	“their	own	historiographic	interventions	
emphasized	the	importance	of	cultural	formation	in	the	historical	process	perhaps	
more	strongly	 than	 they	actually	meant,	 in	opposition	 to	 the	determinism	of	 the	
economic	 historians,	 even	 the	 Marxists	 among	 them”	 (Aronowitz	 1993:	 96).		
Therefore,	Thompson’s	critique	rings	somewhat	hollow.	On	this	and	other	 issues,	
Anderson	and	Thompson	have	much	more	in	common	that	they	deign	to	admit.
	 Other	commentators	have	noted	that	the	differences	between	Anderson	
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and	Thompson	are	likely	overblown.		As	Susan	Magarey	notes,	“Edward	Thompson	
repudiated	the	label	‘culturalism’	when	it	was	applied	to	his	work;	Perry	Anderson	
has	never	laid	claim	to	the	label	‘structuralist’”	(1987:	630).		Yet	Thompson	has	come	
to	embody	the	culturalist	tradition	within	British	Marxism,	while	Anderson’s	polemic	
in	Arguments	emerged	as	the	most	visible	representative	of	structuralism.		It	should	
be	noted,	however,	that	Thompson’s	rejection	of	the	“culturalist”	label	was	in	part	
a	reaction	against	Raymond	Williams,	who	had	proudly	accepted	the	“culturalist”	
label	and	from	whom	Thompson	hoped	to	distance	himself.
	 To	fully	understand	Thompson’s	relationship	to	culturalism,	a	closer	reading	
of	his	major	theses	is	necessary.		The	most	oft-quoted	passage	in	MEWC	is	one	of	
several	 definitions	 of	 class	 that	 Thompson	 offers	 in	 his	 introduction.	 	 Taken	 out	
of	context,	 it	seems	to	validate	the	structure/agency	dichotomy	that	has	become	
popular	in	recent	years:
Class	 is	 not	 a	 category	 but	 a	 process.	 	 Classes	 arise	 because	 men	 and	
women,	 in	 determinate	 productive	 relations,	 identify	 their	 antagonistic	
interests,	and	come	to	struggle,	to	think,	and	to	value	in	class	ways;	thus	
the	process	of	class	formation	is	a	process	of	self-making,	although	under	
conditions	which	are	“given.”	(Thompson	1964:	107)		
This	excerpt	merits	some	analysis	since	it	is	so	central	to	Thompson’s	argument.		While	
the	relations	of	production	are	determinate	(as	in,	having	been	definitely	settled),	
they	 are	 not	 determinative	 (as	 in,	 having	 the	 power	 to	 define	 the	 future).	 	 The	
men	 and	 women	 involved	 in	 the	 struggle	 must	 develop	 an	 understanding	 of	
class	 antagonism,	 but	more	 important	 they	must	 act	 in	 “class	ways.”	 	 Therefore,	
class	happens	as	 a	 result	of	 emergence	of	 class-based	activity.	 	 Thompson	deftly	
combines	 the	 objective	 component	 (productive	 relations)	 and	 the	 subjective	
component	(class	consciousness	and	class	action)	of	class	formation,	while	clearly	
placing	more	stock	in	the	latter.	 	 In	a	move	that	foreshadows	Deleuze,	Thompson	
refers	to	class	as	a	“process”	or	a	“becoming,”	once	again	emphasizing	its	dynamic	
nature.
															In	History and Class Consciousness,	Georg	Lukács	famously	distinguished	
between	 class-in-itself	 and	 class-for-itself.	 	 The	 former	 refers	 to	 the	 “objective”	
identity	 of	 the	working	 class,	 as	 determined	 by	 productive	 relations.	 	 The	 latter	
connotes	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 social	 body	 that	 self-identifies	 as	 the	 working	
class.		Thompson	allegedly	eliminates	this	distinction.		More	precisely,	he	seems	to	
dismiss	the	category	of	“class-in-itself”	entirely,	and	reduce	the	category	of	“working	
class”	to	nothing	more	than	“class-for-itself.”		For	Thompson	the	working	class	does	
not	fully	exist	until	it	achieves	class	consciousness.		Put	differently,	at	least	during	
his	 strongest	 moments,	 Thompson	 seems	 to	 completely	 reject	 the	 “objective”	
dimension	of	class,	in	favor	of	its	“subjective”	component.
	 Criticisms	 of	 Thompson	 often	 attack	 a	 gross	 caricature	 of	 his	 actual	
argument.	 	 Thompson	 did	 not	 ignore	 the	 real,	 grounded,	 “objective”	 conditions	
of	 class	 formation—in	 fact,	 he	 remained	 keenly	 aware	 of	 their	 continued	
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importance.	 	 Likewise,	 he	 did	 not	 present	 class	 as	 a	 mythical,	 free-floating	
concept.	 	But	 in	 granting	 the	primacy	of	 cultural	 components	of	 class	 formation,	
Thompson	apparently	challenged	a	sacred	dogma	of	Marxist	orthodoxy.
	 Some	 critics	 even	 reduce	 the	 Anderson–Thompson	 debate	 to	 lingering	
grudges	about	a	struggle	for	the	control	of	the	New Left Review	(NLR).		The	NLR,	co-
founded	by	Thompson	in	1960	and	initially	edited	by	cultural	studies	pioneer	Stuart	
Hall,	quickly	became	the	leading	English-language	voice	for	dissident	(anti-Stalinist)	
Marxists.	Its	early	years	were	marked	by	a	series	of	power	struggles	that	were	often	
played	 out	 on	 its	 pages.	 	With	 regard	 to	Anderson	 and	 Thompson,	 the	 facts	 are	
quite	clear—Thompson	hired	Anderson	to	head	up	the	NLR	 in	1963.	 	Within	one	
year,	Anderson	had	fired	Thompson,	realigned	the	board	of	directors	 in	his	 favor,	
and	assumed	directorship	of	the	journal	himself.		Thompson	remained	a	prominent	
figure	in	the	British	neo-Marxist	milieu,	but	never	reassumed	control	of	the	NLR,	so	
there	is	no	shortage	of	bad	blood	between	the	two	men.	At	times,	the	debate	leans	
toward	comedy,	as	in	Thompson	Dickensian	caricature	of	Anderson.6		But	the	real	
point	of	tension	centers	on	another	prominent	intellectual	in	the	European	Marxist	
scene—one	Louis	Althusser.
	 In	the	1960s,	Thompson	succeeded	in	persuading	a	significant	number	of	
Marxist	intellectuals	to	all	but	disown	Althusser.		In	an	obvious	reference	to	Althusser’s	
base–superstructure	dichotomy	from	“Ideology	and	Ideological	State	Apparatuses,”	
Thompson	writes,	“historical	change	eventuates,	not	because	a	given	‘basis’	must	
give	 rise	 to	 a	 correspondent	 ‘superstructure,’	 but	 because	 changes	 in	 productive	
relationships	are	experienced	in	social	and	cultural	life,	refracted	in	men’s	ideas	and	
their	values,	and	argued	through	in	their	actions”	(Thompson	1978:	22).		Today,	the	
Anderson–Thompson	debate	deserves	being	revisited	in	light	of	the	recent	return	
to	Althusser,	led	by	such	prominent	thinkers	as	Derrida,	Butler,	and,	in	his	own	way,	
Foucault.		Like	Althusser,	these	scholars	displaced	the	subject	as	the	crucial	agent	of	
history.		If	the	intellectual	tide	is	now	swinging	back	towards	Altussser,	might	that	
portend	 a	 left	 reading	 of	 Anderson’s	 defense	 of	 Althusser’s	 structuralism	 against	
Thompson’s	 (now	 somewhat	 less	 trendy)	 Marxist	 humanism?	 	 Or	 is	 Anderson’s	
Althusser	significantly	different	from	the	Althusser	that	has	recently	been	embraced	
by	the	academic	left?		These	questions	deserve	further	analysis.
	 Althusser	 is	 often	 cast	 as	 a	 crude	 economic	 determinist.	 	 Imprudent	
statements	 like	 the	 following	 lend	 credence	 to	 that	 characterization:	 “The	 class	
struggle	does	not	go	on	 in	 the	air	…	 it	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	mode	of	production	and	
exploitation	 in	 a	 given	 class	 society.	 The	 emphasis	 reverts	 continually	 towards	
the	economic	base.	To	contend	that	social	formations	typically	derive	their	unity	
from	 the	 diffusion	 of	 values,	 or	 the	 exercise	 of	 violence,	 across	 a	 plurality	 of	
individual	or	group	wills	is	to	reject	the	Marxist	insistence	on	the	ultimate	primacy	
of	economic	determinations	of	history”	(Althusser	1969:	34).		At	first	glance,	this	
rigidly	deterministic	view	seems	to	align	closely	with	some	of	Anderson’s	writing:	
“The	problem	of	social	order	is	irresoluble	so	long	as	the	answer	to	it	is	sought	at	
the	level	of	intention	…	It	is,	and	must	be,	the	dominant	mode	of	production	that	
confers	fundamental	unity	on	a	social	formation,	allocating	their	objective	positions	
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to	classes	within	it,	and	distributing	the	agents	within	each	class”	(Anderson	1978:	
55).	 	But	Althusser’s	 intention	was	not	to	position	the	economy	at	the	center	of	
social	 life,	even	 if	 some	of	his	 statements,	when	 taken	out	of	 context,	 give	 that	
impression.		Rather,	he	will	best	be	remembered	for	his	questioning	the	primacy	
of	 the	 Hegelian	 subject,	 and	 his	 contributions	 to	 the	 revival	 of	 anti-humanist	
philosophy.			
		 Althusser	famously	posited	an	“epistemological	break”	between	the	naively	
humanist	“early	Marx”	(of	the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844)	and	
the	more	sophisticated	“late	Marx”	(of	Capital).	 	 In	his	view,	the	authentic	Marx	
emerged	 at	 or	 about	 1852.	 	 In	 his	 reading	 of	Marx,	 the	 development	 of	 entire	
societies	could	be	determined,	though	only	“in	the	last	instance,”	by	the	economy.		In	
his	famous	phrase,	which	is	often	crudely	taken	out	of	context,	history	is	a	“process	
without	a	subject.”		It	is	not	difficult	to	understand	why	Thompson,	whose	theories	
leaned	so	heavily	on	the	autonomous	human	subject,	would	wholeheartedly	reject	
Althusser.		Yet	even	Althusser	was	not	the	rigid	economic	determinist	that	Thompson	
and	his	humanist	followers	tried	to	depict.		In	Poverty,	Thompson	goes	to	lengths	to	
depict	Althusser	as	the	consummate	Stalinite,	and	Anderson	as	his	lackey,	but	the	
men’s	records	tell	a	quite	different	story.		Althusser	was	outspoken	in	his	criticisms	
of	the	USSR	before	it	was	popular	to	do	so,	and	he	broke	with	the	French	Communist	
Party	over	their	position	on	the	events	of	May	1968,	among	other	issues.		(True	to	
form,	Althusser	rejected	the	label	“structuralist.”)		Furthermore,	Anderson	himself	
was	anything	but	an	orthodox	Althusserian.		Under	his	tenure	at	the	NLR,	a	number	
of	articles	formulating	criticisms	of	Althusser	were	published,	and	Anderson	does	
the	same	in	his	own	books.		Britain	at	the	time	was	rife	with	orthodox	Althusserians,	
but	Anderson	was	not	 one	of	 them.	 	 Indeed,	 if	 one	desired	 to	 attack	Althusser	
vicariously	via	one	of	his	 followers,	one	could	hardly	have	picked	a	worse	target	
than	Anderson.
	 Indeed,	 the	cultural	studies	baton	would	be	passed	off	 in	the	 late	1970s	
and	 early	 1980s	 to	 Stuart	 Hall’s	 Centre	 for	 Cultural	 Studies,	 who	 attempted	 a	
synthesis	 of	 Thompsonian	 cultural	 history	 along	 with	 (their	 own	 version)	 of	
Althusserianism.	 	 There	were	 important	methodological	 differences	between	 the	
Thompson	and	Hall	camps,	which	exacerbated	antagonisms	on	both	sides.	Rather	
than	pouring	over	historical	documents,	as	Thompson	had	done	in	preparing	MEWC	
and	 his	 other	 major	 works,	 Hall’s	 followers	 tended	 to	 be	 theoretically	 oriented,	
shunning	painstaking	empiricism	in	favor	of	pure	theory.
	 There	is	a	danger	that	the	entire	debate	might	be	reduced	to	a	question	
of	 free	 will	 versus	 determinism	 (or	 what	 sociologists	 often	 call	 “structure	 vs.	
agency”).	 	 The	 reality	 is	 both	more	 sophisticated,	 and	more	 petty,	 and	 not	 only	
because	 neither	 Anderson	 nor	 Thompson	 are	 adequate	 representatives	 of	 these	
respective	“positions.”		Although	Thompson	is	clearly	aligned	with	the	“agency”	pole,	
his	“deep	historicism”	is	considerably	more	complex.		Thompson	forcefully	asserts	
the	 primacy	 of	 history	 over	 theory,	 and	 makes	 the	 admittedly	 tautological	 case	
that	arguments	about	historiography	can	best	be	evaluated	against	 the	backdrop	
of	historical	fact.	 	What	begins	as	a	defense	of	Marxist	history	quickly	becomes	a	
defense	 of	 the	 historical	 enterprise	 in	 general,	 as	 he	 insists	 on	 the	 determinate	
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properties	of	(historical)	facts.		Thompson’s	attack	is	not	on	theory	per se,	but	on	a	
proto-postmodern	relativism.		Thompson	argues	against	both	crude	empiricism	(he	
would	 unquestionably	 take	 issue	 with	 the	 “socio-economic	 status”	 variable	 that	
most	quantitative	sociologists	use	as	a	stand-in	for	class)	and	against	unprincipled	
theoreticism	(à	la	Althusser).		Instead,	he	pushes	for	a	cautious,	historically-grounded	
empiricism.		
	 Thompson’s	position	on	determinacy	 is	 complex	 to	 say	 the	 least.	 	While	
in	 one	 passage	 he	writes,	 “People	were	 so	 hungry	 that	 they	were	willing	 to	 risk	
their	lives	upsetting	a	barrow	of	potatoes.		In	these	conditions,	it	might	appear	more	
surprising	if	men	had	not	plotted	revolutionary	uprisings	than	if	they	had”	(Thompson	
1964:	 592),	 he	 seems	 to	 contradict	 himself	 elsewhere,	 as	when	 he	 critiques	 the	
“abbreviated	 and	 ‘economistic’	 picture	 of	 the	 food	 riot	 as	 a	 direct,	 spasmodic,	
irrational	 response	to	hunger”	 (Thompson	1964:	528).	 	So	as	much	as	Thompson	
argues	 against	 the	 notion	 that	 rebellion	 is	 an	 instinctual	 preconscious	 response	
to	hunger,	he	strives	 to	maintain	 the	causal	connection	between	deprivation	and	
revolt.		
	 So	Anderson	the	neo-positivist	uses	Althusser	in	his	economic	determinist	
mode	as	a	weapon	against	Thompson.		But	in	a	certain	sense	it	is	Althusser	the	anti-
humanist	who	delivers	a	more	searing	critique	of	Thompson—a	side	of	Althusser	
that	Anderson	clearly	chooses	to	 ignore,	for	 it	slices	both	ways.	 	Surely	Anderson	
understands	that,	were	he	to	invoke	Althusser	the	anti-humanist,	his	own	project	
would	likewise	be	dead	in	the	water.
Thompson and Sociology	
	 MEWC	 could	 not	 be	 more	 different	 from	 the	 dominant	 strains	 of	
comparative-historical	 sociology.	 	 	 Thompson	 was	 attacked	 anew	 in	 the	 1980s	
and	 1990s	 by	 a	 new	 generation	 of	 scholars,	 most	 of	 them	 too	 young	 to	 have	
witnessed	his	debates	with	Anderson	firsthand.		Yet	their	critiques	were	very	much	
in	the	tradition	of	Anderson—they	were	methodological	 in	nature.		Craig	Calhoun	
argued	 that	 Thompson	 “does	 not	 much	 examine	 structural positions	 of	 workers	
within	 the	economy	as	a	whole”	 (Calhoun	1982:	21;	my	emphasis).	 The	eminent	
British	sociologist	Anthony	Giddens	similarly	criticized	MEWC	 for	“[collapsing]	the	
spectrum	of	conditions	which	actually	led	to	the	formation	of	the	English	working	
class	 ...	 into	an	opposition	between	protest	and	 resistance	 largely	 internal	 to	 the	
ideas	and	behavior	of	the	members	of	the	working	class	themselves”	(Giddens	1987:	
212;	my	emphasis).		Robert	Murphy	accuses	Thompson	of	defining	class	as	“an	act	
of	will	rather	than	by	objective situation”	(Murphy	1986:	256)	and	insinuates	that	
Thompson’s	 working	 class	 “disappears”	 when	 it	 loses	 consciousness.	 	 (This	 is	 of	
course	a	gross	exaggeration	and	an	incredible	oversimplifcation	of	Thompson’s	quite	
nuanced	argument.)		By	now,	these	critiques	should	be	familiar.		Calhoun,	Giddens	
and	Murphy	argue	for	the	primacy	of	“structural	positions,”	“conditions,”	and	the	
“objective	 situation.”	 	 They	are	 simply	 rehearsing	 the	arguments	Anderson	made	
twenty	years	earlier,	with	only	the	slightest	variation.
	 But	historians	 like	 Thompson	are	under	no	obligation	 to	 generalize,	 and	
Thompson	makes	no	claim	to	comprehensiveness.	 	A	detailed	examination	of	the	
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economic	conditions	of	early	industrial	Britain	might	be	a	useful	project—but	it	is	
not	Thompson’s.		To	turn	the	tables,	mainstream	historical	sociology	might	stand	to	
benefit	from	the	careful,	“micro-level”	analysis	that	Thompson	does	so	well.		One	
gets	 the	 sense	 that	 Calhoun,	 Giddens,	 Murphy	 and	 Thompson’s	 other	 critics	
are	 superimposing	 their	 own	 set	 of	 sociological	 standards	 over	 of	 a	 completely	
disanalagous	study.		If	Thompson	is	to	be	judged	by	any	standards,	it	is	only	fair	that	
they	be	the	standards	required	by	his	intellectual	project.
	 Similar	 problems	 emerge	 when	 authors	 attempt	 to	 merge	 Thompson	
with	 other	 comparative–historical	 	 luminaries.	 	 For	 example,	 Alvin	 So	 and	
Muhammad	 Hikam	 (1989)	 try	 to	 synthesize	 Thompson	 and	 Wallerstein	 to	
produce	 a	 third,	 composite	 method.	 Although	 exiled	 to	 the	 semi-periphery	 at	
SUNY	 Binghamton,	 Wallerstein’s	 influence	 on	 comparative–historical	 sociology	
is	 immeasurable.	 	 So	 and	 Hakim	 devote	 twenty	 pages	 to	 exploring	 connections	
and	possible	alliances	between	the	two	men.	 	They	depict	the	two	as	 intellectual	
siblings,	and	even	propose	an	analytical	technique	they	call	“class	struggle	analysis,”	
designed	to	fuse	the	two	authors	at	the	hip.			Yet	So	and	Hikam’s	reasoning	seems	
a	bit	 forced—Wallerstein’s	world-system	analysis	represents	grand	theory	 if	there	
ever	was	one.		Thompson’s	obsession	with	working-class	poetry	could	not	be	further	
removed	from	Wallerstein’s	efforts	to	design	an	all-encompassing	model	of	global	
capitalism.
	 Eventually,	 So	and	Hakim’s	 true	 intentions	are	 laid	bare—to	 subordinate	
Thompson	to	a	Wallersteinian	approach,	even	as	they	purport	to	remain	faithful	to	
both.		So	and	Hikam	(1989)	accuse	Thompson	of	“a-structural	analysis;	subjectivism;	
and	unclear	class	boundaries.”	 	Drawing	on	Craig	Calhoun’s	The Question of Class 
Struggle—a	book-length	diatribe	against	Thompson—the	authors	argue:
	
	 The	spectrum	of	conditions	which	actually	led	to	the	formation	of	the		 	
	 English	working	class	are	collapsed	into	an	opposition	between	protest		
	 and	resistance	largely	internal	to	the	ideas	and	behavior	of	the	members		
	 of	the	working	class	themselves.	(1989:	461)
	 So	and	Hikam	further	criticize	Thompson,	arguing	that	“struggle	to	form	(or	
before	forming)	a	class	should	not	be	conceptualized	as	class	struggle	because	the	
goal	of	class	formation	may	not	materialize”	(1989:	455).	So	struggle	by	a	putative	
“class”	prior	to	the	“moment”	of	class	formation	(as	defined	by	Thompson)	is	not	
actually	class	struggle	since	it	is	uncertain	at	that	point	whether	or	not	a	class	will	
emerge.	 	 Despite	 their	 best	 intentions,	 this	 modification	 probably	 creates	 more	
problems	than	 it	 resolves.	 	For	one	thing,	Thompson	never	suggests	that	there	 is	
a	“single,	definable	moment”	of	class	formation.	 	Rather,	as	he	asserts	numerous	
times,	class	formation	is	a	process.		Some	classes	might	form	more	successfully	than	
others,	but	nowhere	does	he	suggest	it	is	possible	to	isolate	the	turning	point	at	which	
a	pre-class	formation	becomes	an	actual	class.		Second,	So	and	Hakim’s	definition	
of	class	struggle	only	emerges	after	the	fact,	once	it	is	finally	clear	that	a	class	has,	
in	fact,	been	formed.		This	seems	to	grant	the	historian	special	power	to	distinguish	
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class	 struggle	 from	 not-yet-class-struggle.	 	 Finally,	 their	 definition	 assumes	 that	
unsuccessful	or	partially	successful	struggle	is	not	actually	class	struggle.
	 But	 there	 is	 another	 problem	 here.	 	 Despite	 MEWC’s	 title,	 Thompson	
acknowledges	that	British	workers	rarely	self-identified	as	a	“working	class.”		Instead,	
they	 used	 the	much	 broader	 descriptor	 “productive	 class.”	 	 This	 term	 refers	 not	
only	to	the	proletariat,	but	to	an	ad	hoc	class	alliance	that	included	petty-bourgeois	
elements	 and	 remnants	 of	 the	 pre-industrial	 era,	 including	 store	 owners,	 small-
time	 manufacturers	 and	 self-employed	 artisans.	 	 Indeed,	 the	 “productive	 class”	
comprised	the	vast	majority	of	British	society,	excluding	only	large	manufacturers,	
major	 landowners,	 nobility,	 and	 royalty.	 	 That	 British	 people	 failed	 to	 draw	 class	
boundaries	more	narrowly	is	a	problem,	in	Aronowitz’s	view.		The	point	is	not	that	
the	working	class	should	forgo	cross-class	alliances	(even	Marx	predicted	that	the	
petty-bourgeois	would	eventually	view	their	interests	as	more	closely	aligned	with	
the	proletariat	than	with	the	capitalists),	but	that	the	workers	must	self-identify	as	
a	class	before	they	can	build	coalitions.		Proletarians	have	a	fundamentally	different	
relationship	 to	capitalist	production	 than	do	small-business	owners	or	craftsmen,	
and	understanding	this	relationship	is	a	prerequisite	for	successful	class	formation.		
But	 to	what	 extent	 does	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 “productive	 class”	 bleed	 into	 Thompson’s	
own	definition	of	the	working	class?		For	Craig	Calhoun,	Thompson’s	loose	definition	
of	 class	 leads	 him	 to	 include	 some	 workers	 who	 ought	 to	 be	 considered	 petty	
bourgeois.		Aronowitz	is	quite	forgiving,	but	Calhoun	is	far	more	pointed:	“so	much	of	
what	Thompson	calls	‘the	making	of	the	working	class’	is	the	reactionary	radicalism	
of	the	artisinate”		(1982:	103).	There	is	some	truth	to	this	critique,	but	in	my	view	it	
stems	from	a	fundamental	misunderstanding	of	Thompson’s	intellectual	project.
	 Thompson’s	work	begs	the	question:	What	might	it	mean	to	treat	class	not	
as	a	unit of	analysis,	or	as	an	operationalizable	category,	but	as	a	conceptual	frame	to	
be	employed	for	the	purpose	of	explaining	and	interpreting	social	relations?		This	
project	may	be	beyond	the	bounds	of	mainstream	sociology,	but	it	is	a	worthwhile	
one.		Even	when	presented	the	opportunity	to	more	precisely	define	and	delimit	his	
concept	of	class,	Thompson	refuses.
	 Theda	 Skocpol’s	 mapping	 of	 the	 field	 offers	 some	 insight	 here.	 	 In	 the	
concluding	chapter	of	her	edited	collection,	Skocpol	(1984)	sketches	out	three	major	
methodological	strategies	for	comparative–historical	sociology.	These	consist	of	(1)	
a	deductive	approach,	(2)	an	interpretive	approach,	and	(3)	an	analytical	approach.	
To	grossly	oversimplify	her	 complex	argument,	deductive	scholars	map	 individual	
case	studies	on	general	models,	interpretive	scholars	explain	case	studies	without	
reliance	on	model-making,	while	analytical	scholars	combine	these	two	strategies.	
(Skocpol	clearly	favors	strategy	3,	and	locates	herself	within	this	tradition.)	According	
to	Skocpol,	Anderson	favors	strategy	1,	while	Thompson	confines	himself	strictly	to	
strategy	2.		Thompson’s	critics	(Calhoun,	So	and	Hikam,	et	al.)	work	within	strategies	
1	and	3,	and	seek	to	criticize	Thompson	on	these	bases,	without	recognizing	that	his	
work	lies	within	strategy	2.	 	Their	critique,	which	is	based	on	their	standards,	not	
Thompson’s	own,	therefore	falls	flat.	
	 Thompson	ultimately	has	a	complex	and	tenuous	relationship	to	mainstream	
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sociology.		Thompson’s	assertion	that	classes	are	“made”	has	reached	the	point	of	
a	 certain	 orthodoxy	 among	 class	 theorists	 and	 sociologists.	 	 His	 short	 preface	 is	
probably	among	the	most	quoted	texts	 in	 the	field,	and	for	a	sociologist	 to	write	
about	class	without	mentioning	Thompson	would	approach	heresy.		In	terms	of	the	
respective	impacts	on	sociology,	Thompson	clearly	takes	the	prize,	with	Anderson	
reduced	to	a	mere	footnote,	if	he	deserves	mention	at	all.		In	a	catch-all	textbook	the	
eminent	British	sociologist	Anthony	Giddens	has	written:
	
E.	P.	Thompson	could	be	described	as	the	sociologists’	historian.	 	There	
are	 few	historians	whom	sociologists	 are	more	 fond	of	quoting	 	 ...	 The	
affinity	which	sociologists	feel	for	Thompson’s	work	can	be	explained	...	by	
reference	to	Thompson’s	concern	with	problems	of	class	 formation	and	
class	consciousness.		(Giddens	1987:	203)
	
But	Giddens	pointedly	neglects	to	mention	that	the	feeling	was	not	mutual.		Indeed,	
Thompson	 seemed	 to	 harbor	 a	 deep-seated	 resentment	 toward	 sociology.	 	 His	
introduction	 ranks	 among	 the	 more	 powerful	 and	 angry	 critiques	 of	 sociology	
written	 to	 date.	 	 After	 rereading	 MEWC,	 one	 begins	 to	 wonder	 how	 many	 of	
Thompson’s	 admirers	 have	 any	 sort	 of	 familiarity	 with	 the	 text	 at	 all.	 	 While	
sociologists	constantly	cite	MEWC’s	fifteen-page	introduction,	in	which	he	lays	out	
the	theoretical	underpinnings	of	his	argument,	few	deign	to	wade	into	the	body	of	
the	text,	and	fewer	still	emulate	Thompson’s	method.	Of	course,	it	doesn’t	help	that	
Thompson’s	introduction	includes	a	series	of	spirited	jabs	at	sociology,	like	this	one:	
“the	finest-meshed	 sociological	net	 cannot	give	us	a	pure	 specimen	of	 class,	 any	
more	than	it	can	give	us	one	of	deference	or	of	love”	(Thompson	1963:	9).
	 Statements	like	these	leave	Thompson	vulnerable	to	the	claim	that	he	fails	
to	define	class	boundaries.		Taking	his	metaphor	a	bit	too	literally,	Murphy	counters,	
“it	would	be	helpful	to	know	whether	Thompson	is	using	a	finely-meshed	net	which	
catches	 almost	 everyone	 in	 the	 ‘working	 people,’	 or	 a	 wide-meshed	 net	 which	
catches	virtually	no	one,	or	what	in	fact	his	‘working	people’	net	does	catch”	(Murphy	
1986:	255).	Of	course,	this	quip	completely	misses	the	point:	Thompson	deliberately	
refuses	to	define	class	 in	a	neat,	bounded,	and	“measurable”	way.	 	This	 is	not	an	
omission	on	his	part,	but	 rather	 is	 characteristic	of	his	overall	method.	 	 It	 seems	
Thompson	has	 expanded	 the	 concept	 of	 class	 struggle	by	 including	 in	 it	 not	 just	
the	struggle	after	forming	a	class,	but	also	the	struggle	to form	a	class	(or	even	the	
struggle	before forming	a	class).	 	So	class	moves	from	an	analytical	category	to	a	
heuristic	device—a	move	that	foreshadows	the	anti-positivist	critique	of	the	human	
sciences.
	 Within	sociology,	positivism	has	been	and	remains	the	dominant	strain.		The	
explosion	of	 cultural	 studies,	 science	 studies,	 and	post–second-wave	 feminism	 in	
the	 1980s	 and	 early	 1990s	 briefly	 seemed	 to	 challenge	 the	 positivist	 orthodoxy,	
only	 to	 be	 reabsorbed	 by	 the	 2000s.	 	 Today,	 even	 the	 American	 Sociological	
Association’s	unorthodox	theory	section	is	controlled	by	methodological	positivists.	
Although	 methodological	 positivism	 is	 usually	 associated	 with	 quantitatively-
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oriented	sociologists,	George	Steinmetz	(among	others)	has	argued	that	qualitative	
sociologists	 commit	 the	 same	 crimes	 with	 blunter	 weapons.	 Few	 sociologists	
openly	stake	a	claim	to	the	legacy	of	Auguste	Comte,	but	his	specter	still	haunts	the	
discipline’s	hallowed	halls.		Even	the	most	qualitatively-oriented	sociologists	adhere	
to	methodological	 positivism	 to	 an	 extent	 that	 is	 unmatched	 in	 the	 humanities.	
For	 Steinmetz,	 positivist	 social	 science	 has	 a	 number	 of	 key	 features,	 but	 the	
necessary	condition	for	epistemological	positvism,	or	its	“common	denominator	…	
is	the	orientation	to	regularity	determinism	or	covering	laws”	(2005:	285).	That	is,	
positivists	assume	for	every	event	y	there	is	an	event	x	or	set	of	events	x
1
...x
n
	which	
can	be	neatly	predicted	based	on	y.		To	be	sure,	not	all	positivsts	adhere	rigidly	to	this	
formulation,	but	according	to	Steinmetz,	this	logic	constitutes	an	“epistemological	
unconscious,”	which	structures	and	delimits	the	possibilities	for	sociological	thought	
even	 when	 it	 is	 not	 explicitly	 invoked.	 	 Secondarily,	 positivists	 adopt	 a	 hardline	
scientific	naturalism,	or	the	assumption	that	“the	social	world	can	be	studies	in	the	
same	general	manner	 as	 a	 the	natural	world”	 (2005:	 283).	 In	 the	process,	 social	
scientists	borrow	many	of	the	tools	of	natural	science,	with	its	requisite	emphasis	
on	prediction	and	willful	ignorance	of	concept,	time	and	space	dependence.		Critics	
of	 positivism	 claim	 that	 social	 scientists	 should	 reject	 the	presuppositions	 of	 the	
natural	sciences	and	create	new	methodologies	appropriate	to	their	unique	objects	
of	study.
	 On	the	other	hand,	history,	as	a	discipline,	has	long	tread	the	fuzzy	boundary	
between	the	humanities	and	the	social	sciences.		Not	quite	systematic	enough	to	be	
a	social	science,	but	too	obsessed	with	“truth”	and	“facts”	to	join	the	humanities,	
history	occupies	a	wasteland	within	the	academy.		Thompson,	for	his	part,	clearly	
seeks	to	move	history	away	from	its	social	scientific	counterparts	but	does	so	from	
within	the	framework	of	Marxist	history,	where	a	somewhat	different	but	no	 less	
doctrinaire	positivism	reigns	supreme.
	 During	 the	 1970s	 and	 1980s,	Marxism	was	 eclipsed	 by	 Erik	 Olin	Wright	
and	 the	 self-described	 “analytical”	Marxists,	 whose	 intellectual	 project	 centered	
on	recuperating	Marxist	categories	for	quantitative	sociology.		Countless	gallons	of	
ink	were	 spilled	 on	 such	 critical	 tasks	 as	 “proving”	Marx’s	 labor	 theory	 of	 value,	
as	 though	 the	 successful	 completion	 of	 this	 task	 would	 vindicate	Marxism	 once	
and	 for	 all.	 	 But	Wright’s	 approach,	which	 Aronowitz	 (2003)	 dismisses	 as	 “social	
cartography,”	explicitly	ignores	the	cultural	dimensions	of	class	formation.	Likewise,	
Wright	has	no	interest	in	history;	rather	than	explain	when	and	how	classes	form,	his	
analysis	is	consumed	with	accounting	for	class	relations	at	a	given	moment.
	 In	a	similar	vein,	empirically-oriented	sociologists	 typically	operationalize	
class	 using	 the	 variable	 “socio-economic	 status”	 (SES)—itself	 an	 aggregate	
of	 income,	 net	 assets,	 occupational	 prestige,	 and	 education	 level.	 	 Following	
Thompson,	a	number	of	critical	 sociologists	have	argued	that	while	SES	might	be	
an	adequate	measure	of	 (Weberian)	status,	 it	does	not	accurately	measure	class,	
since	 it	completely	 ignores	 ideology,	consciousness,	and	history—the	“subjective”	
components	 of	 social	 class.	 	 Of	 course,	 “class	 consciousness”	 never	 appears	 on	
the	General	Social	Survey	and	would	be	difficult	to	 input	 into	SPSS.	 	“Measuring”	
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consciousness	can	only	be	achieved	 through	 the	kind	of	deep	historical	narrative	
that	Thompson	attempts	in	MEWC—completely	foreign	to	most	sociologists,	even	
those	of	a	qualitative	orientation.
	 For	 these	 reasons,	 as	 impressive	 as	 MEWC	 is,	 it	 might	 not	 meet	 the	
standards	of	academic	rigor	that	pervade	contemporary	sociology.		As	a	discipline,	
sociology	has	a	 structuralist	bias.	 	Even	“cultural	 sociologists”	have	drawn	the	 ire	
of	“cultural	studies”	scholars	(often	located	in	the	humanities)	for	overemphasizing	
the	 structural	 dimension	 of	 social	 life.	 	 One	 even	wonders	 if	MEWC	would	 even	
meet	the	minimum	expectations	of	a	typical	dissertation	committee.		 If	there	is	a	
single	defining	characteristic	of	sociology,	it	is	the	impulse	to	build	models,	create	
categories	 and	 generalize	 across	multiple	 cases.	 	Only	 the	postmodernists	 at	 the	
fringe	 of	 the	 discipline	 have	 completely	 rejected	 generalization	 as	 a	 worthwhile	
strategy.	 	 The	 sociologist	who	 rejects	 the	discipline’s	holy	 triumvirate—modeling,	
generalization,	and	comparison—is	by	most	accounts	not	a	sociologist	at	all.
	 The	 other	 problem	 with	 Thompson’s	 method	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	
mainstream	 social	 science	 is	 his	 understanding	 of	 time.	 	 While	 statisticians	 can	
compare	 fixed	 points	 along	 a	 timeline	 (using	 a	 time-series	 analysis	 or	 a	 cohort	
study),	they	cannot	easily	measure	the	dynamic	nature	of	historical	processes.		But,	
of	course,	historical	processes	(like	class	formation)	are	constantly	in	transition.		As	
the	 Heisenberg	 principle	 famously	 states,	 one	 cannot	 study	 sub-atomic	 particles	
themselves	but	only	their	effects.		Modern	sociology	lacks	the	ability	to	deal	with	
time-in-motion.		Time-series	and	cohort-based	analysis	are	still	atemporal	insofar	as	
they	are	premised	on	observing	social	phenomena	at	a	fixed moment	in	time.		On	
the	 other	 hand,	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 of	 temporality	 in	 Thompson’s	 writing	 that	 few	
sociologists	 even	 approximate.	 	 Early	 in	 his	 career,	 Thompson	 penned	 an	 often-
overlooked	essay	entitled	“Time,	Work-Discipline,	and	Industrial	Capitalism”	(1967)	
in	which	he	explains	the	rise	of	the	clock,	and	the	modern	concept	of	time	itself,	
in	the	context	of	the	capitalist	revolution	and	working-class	resistance.		Thompson	
argues	that	bosses	eliminated	the	pre-modern	notion	of	time—which	was	basically	
task-oriented—and	replaced	it	with	regimented	factory	time—with	an	emphasis	on	
subdivision	and	precision—for	the	purpose	of	extracting	maximum	labor	from	the	
new	proletariat.		The	idea	of	time	itself was	radically	transformed.		In	one	of	his	more	
convincing	moments,	Thompson	argues	that	class	cannot	be	measured	ahistorically:	
“If	we	stop	history	at	a	given	point,	then	there	are	no	classes	but	simply	a	multitude	
of	individuals	with	a	multitude	of	experiences	but	if	we	watch	these	men	over	an	
adequate	period	of	social	change,	we	observe	patterns	in	their	relationships,	their	
ideas,	and	their	institutions.	Class	is	defined	by	men	as	they	live”	(Thompson	1964:	
11).	This	rigid	insistence	on	the	dynamic	nature	of	class	is	appealing	rhetorically,	but	
it	presents	an	insurmountable	challenge	to	the	cottage	industry	that	has	organized	
around	the	notion	that	class	exists	as	a	static	category,	outside	of	time.
	 One	final	question	 remains:	what	use	do	sociologists	have	 for	history?	 	 If	
Thompson’s	 MEWC	 is	 only	 tolerable	 when	 eviscerated	 and	 subsumed	 under	 the	
rubric	 of	 a	 demonstrably	 sociological	 frame,	 what	 is	 it	 actually	 worth	 on its own 
terms?	 	 The	most	prominent	 comparative–historical	 sociologists—Moore,	 Skocpol,	
Tilly,	Wallerstein—wield	 grand	 theory	 like	 a	 sledgehammer.	 	 Similarly,	 Anderson’s	
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essays,	 along	 with	 his	 masterworks	 Lineages	 and	 Passages	 are	 predicated	
upon	 the	 assumption	 that	 a	 particular	 model—one	 in	 which	 the	 working	 class	
achieves	“full”	development—is	preferable.	In	contrast,	Thompson	offers	nothing	in	
the	way	of	grand	theory	but	instead	offers	a	theory	of	pure	historical	contingency	that	
is	anathema	to	most	historically-oriented	sociologists.			But	it	should	be	no	surprise	
that,	in	the	process	of	fusing	two	disciplines	with	asymmetrical	properties,	one	will	
be	forced	to	bend.		As	Sewell	(1996)	has	keenly	observed,	making	sociology	historical	
cannot	simply	be	a	question	of	increasing	the	number	of	data	points.		It	may	even	be	
the	case	that,	against	the	wishes	of	mainstream	comparative–historical	sociologists,	
history	and	sociology	are	not	entirely	compatible.	Taking	history	seriously	will	require	
abandoning	old	assumptions,	adopting	new	methodological	orientations,	and	in	the	
process,	overturning	many	of	the	foundations	of	sociology	itself.
_________________________________________________
1	 	 	What	has	become	known	as	the	Anderson–Thompson	debate	refers	to	a	series	of	books	
and	 articles	 spanning	 five	 years.	 In	 chronological	 order,	 they	 are	 Thompson’s	 book	Making 
of the English Working Class (1964,	hereafter	MEWC);	Anderson’s	 review	article	“Origins	of	
the	Present	Crisis”	(1964)	in	the	New Left Review	(hereafter	“Origins”);	Thompson’s	response	
“Peculiarities	of	the	English”	(1965)	in	the	Socialist Register,	later	republished	with	minor	edits	in	
an	essay	collection	entitled	The Poverty of Theory 1978	(hereafter	Poverty);	Anderson’s	rebuttal	
“Socialism	and	Pseudo-Empiricism”	(1966)	in	the	New Left Review	(hereafter	“Socialism”);	and	
a	 reissue	 of	 Anderson’s	 previous	 essays	with	 a	 new	 introduction,	 called	Arguments Within 
English Marxism	 (1980,	hereafter	Arguments).	The	tone	of	these	articles	becomes	gradually	
more	antagonistic	as	time	passes.		For	the	sake	of	simplicity,	I	will	ignore	the	contributions	Tom	
Nairn	made	to	the	debate.
2			This	notion	of	class	closely	parallel	Georg	Lukács’	(1971)	distinction	between	“class	in	itself”	
and	“class	 for	 itself,”	although	Thompson	does	not	use	this	terminology,	probably	because	
Lukács’	book	was	not	available	in	English	translation	at	the	time.
3	 	 	 If	Anderson	were	to	update	his	piece	today,	he	might	note	that	Britain	has	 led	 the	pack	
of	Western	 European	 democracies	 in	 the	movement	 toward	 Americanization,	 dramatically	
scaling	back	its	already	diminutive	welfare	state.
4			On	the	other	hand,	while	Thompson’s	stated	objective	is	to	rescue	the	British	working	class	
from	charges	of	immaturity,	he	sometimes	goes	too	far,	and	finds	himself	making	claims	about	
British	superiority.		If	Anderson	is	a	Francophile,	Thompson	is	an	unrepentant	Anglophile.		His	
project	is	to	reclaim	a	specifically	British	cultural	history.		Thompson	is	ultimately	something	of	
a	British	nationalist.		In	the	final	analysis,	the	Anderson–Thompson	debate	is	clouded	by	the	
specter	of	nationalism.
5			They	disagree	over	the	nature	and	timing	of	the	bourgeois	revolution.	For	Thompson,	this	
revolution	 dissolves	 into	 a	 series	 of	 events	 that	 stretches	 back	 to	 the	 twelfth	 century	 and	
continues,	 as	 an	 ongoing	 process,	 until	 the	 nineteenth	 century.	 For	 Anderson,	 the	 English	
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aristocracy	remained	well	into	the	nineteenth	and	twentieth	centuries	(in	the	sociological,	not	
titular	sense).
6	 	 	Anderson,	having	a	 less	 refined	sense	of	humor,	 seems	 to	prefer	crass	 insults	 to	 literary	
allusions.	 	At	one	point,	he	accuses	Thompson	of	a	performance	“laden	with	 self-delighted	
pirouettes,	and	constant	sacrifices	of	accuracy	and	sobriety…”		(1966:	6)
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